SSO, RBAC, and Governance
Table of Contents
- Executive Summary
- Why Enterprises Need a Managed URL Shortener
- Reference Architecture at a Glance
- Identity & Access: SSO, SCIM, and Session Hardening
- Choosing Between SAML 2.0 and OpenID Connect
- SCIM Provisioning and Deprovisioning
- JIT (Just‑In‑Time) vs Pre‑Provisioned Accounts
- Session, Token, and MFA Hardening
- RBAC: Roles, Permissions, and Approval Flows
- Role Design Patterns
- Permission Matrix (Example)
- Policy-Driven Access (Attribute- or Tag-Based)
- Change Management and Segregation of Duties
- Governance: Policies, Compliance, and Risk Controls
- Link Governance Policies
- Privacy, Legal, and Regulatory Alignment
- Auditability and Evidence
- DLP, CASB, and Threat Intelligence
- Networking & Edge: Domains, TLS, and WAF
- Vanity Domains and DNS Strategy
- TLS Certificates and HSTS
- CDN, WAF, and Bot Mitigation
- Deployment Options: SaaS vs Self-Hosted
- SaaS Pros and Cons
- Self‑Hosted on Kubernetes (Reference Blueprint)
- Data Model and Policy Hierarchies
- Core Entities
- Inheritance and Overrides
- Operational Workflows
- Link Creation Lifecycle
- Bulk Operations and CSV/API Pipelines
- APIs, OAuth Scopes, and Webhooks
- Analytics, Observability, and SLOs
- Analytics with Privacy Protections
- Logging, Metrics, and Tracing
- Service Level Objectives
- Security Hardening Guide
- Secrets Management and Key Rotation
- Abuse Prevention and Link Hygiene
- IP, Geo, and Device Controls
- Cost, Performance, and Scale
- Rollout Plan and Checklists
- Reference Templates
- Sample RBAC Policy (YAML)
- Example SAML/OIDC Config Snippets
- Kubernetes Ingress Example
- OPA/Rego Policy: Allowed Destination Domains
- Webhook Event Payloads (Examples)
- FAQ Schema (JSON‑LD)
- Conclusion
Executive Summary
Enterprises shorten millions of links across marketing, sales, product, and support channels. Those links are not trivial: they influence brand trust, ad attribution, user privacy, and security posture. A single misconfigured short domain can expose employees to phishing, leak customer data via query parameters, or break multi‑million‑dollar campaigns. This guide shows how to build or deploy an enterprise‑grade URL shortener with SSO, SCIM, RBAC, and governance—without sacrificing developer velocity.
We’ll cover identity integration (SAML/OIDC, SCIM), granular roles and permissions, audit trails, DLP/CASB alignment, network/edge hardening (DNS/TLS/WAF), operational workflows (approvals, bulk pipelines, webhook automation), privacy‑preserving analytics, and SLO‑driven operations. You’ll leave with reference blueprints, policy templates, and hands‑on examples to roll out a secure, compliant, and scalable platform.
Why Enterprises Need a Managed URL Shortener
Business impact:
- Brand consistency: Vanity domains (e.g.,
go.example.com) increase trust and CTR across channels. - Attribution: Clean link structures, consistent UTMs, and deduplication improve measurement quality, ROAS reporting, and funnel analytics.
- Security: Centralized control prevents employees from using risky public shorteners. Policies enforce destination allowlists, link expiration, or password protection.
- Compliance: Govern PII, retention periods, audit trails, and lawful bases for processing across regions.
- Scale: High‑volume pipelines (CSV/API) and programmatic creation enable marketing ops and product teams to move fast without breaking governance.
Risk landscape:
- Phishing and spoofing via lookalike domains or unauthorized URL wrapping.
- PII leakage in query strings or referrers.
- Shadow IT—unapproved tools with unknown data flows.
- Regulatory exposure from unmanaged tracking and retention.
- Operational fragility—no rollback of critical links, no disaster recovery, or missing audit evidence.
An enterprise platform centralizes control, integrates with your IdP, and codifies policy enforcement at link‑creation time (not after a breach).
Reference Architecture at a Glance
A robust enterprise shortener typically includes:
- Edge/CDN/WAF: Terminates TLS, enforces WAF/bot rules, rate limits abusive traffic, and caches static artifacts.
- Routing/API Gateway: AuthN/Z for APIs; protects management interfaces; terminates OAuth/OIDC; validates API keys and mTLS where applicable.
- Shortener Service: Core application resolving slugs to destinations; enforces policies (allowlists, expiry), records click events.
- Admin Console: Policy management, domain onboarding, RBAC, audit views, analytics dashboards.
- Identity: SSO (SAML/OIDC), SCIM for lifecycle, MFA/conditional access, MDM posture checks where supported.
- Data: Primary store for links, domains, tags, orgs; analytics store for click events; object storage for exports; encrypted KMS secrets.
- Observability: Logging, metrics, tracing; SIEM forwarding; alerting and anomaly detection.
- Integrations: Email/SMS/CRM/MA tools; CI/CD; ticketing (Jira/ServiceNow); security telemetry (DLP, CASB, EDR).
The architecture should be multi‑tenant capable (for subsidiaries/brands) with policy inheritance and override controls.
Identity & Access: SSO, SCIM, and Session Hardening
Your IdP (e.g., Azure AD, Okta, Google, Ping) becomes the single source of truth for who can access the shortener and what they can do. The shortener implements SP/RP functionality for SAML/OIDC, consumes SCIM for provisioning, and maps groups/attributes to roles.
Choosing Between SAML 2.0 and OpenID Connect
- SAML 2.0: Mature, XML‑based, widely adopted in enterprises; excellent for browser SSO to the admin console.
- OIDC (OAuth 2.0 on top): JSON/REST‑friendly, better developer ergonomics; ideal for both console and API auth (via confidential/public clients, PKCE).
- Pragmatic approach: Support both. Use SAML for browser SSO where the enterprise mandates it; use OIDC for API integrations and service‑to‑service flows.
Claims and mappings:
- Map NameID /
subto the internal user ID. - Ingest email, displayName, groups, department, costCenter, manager, employeeId, and entitlements (custom).
- Normalize IdP groups (e.g.,
shortener-admins,shortener-marketing,shortener-readonly) to platform roles.
SCIM Provisioning and Deprovisioning
SCIM 2.0 automates user and group lifecycle:
- Create: When a user is assigned in the IdP, SCIM
POST /Usersprovisions an account with attributes and initial role mappings. - Update: Title, department, or manager changes flow via
PATCH. - Deactivate/Reactivate:
active=falsesuspends access; reactivation restores prior role mapping. - Groups: SCIM
Groupsmembership drives attribute‑based access and approval scopes.
Safeguards:
- Reject over‑privileged assignments by validating group → role mappings against an allowlist.
- Enforce domain ownership (e.g., only admins of
brand.example.comcan manage that domain). - Keep idempotency: repeated SCIM calls yield consistent state.
JIT (Just‑In‑Time) vs Pre‑Provisioned Accounts
- JIT: On first SSO, auto‑create a user record with minimal info, then call SCIM in the background for enrichment. Faster rollout.
- Pre‑Provisioned: Strict environments prefer SCIM to run before any login is allowed; gate first login on SCIM success.
- Hybrid: Allow JIT to create a pending profile with viewer role until SCIM confirms role and group memberships.
Session, Token, and MFA Hardening
- MFA at the IdP with conditional access (new device, high‑risk sign‑ins, sensitive roles).
- OIDC: Use PKCE for public clients; rotate refresh tokens; short lifetimes with sliding windows; DPoP or mTLS for higher assurance.
- SAML: Validate audience, recipient, ACS URL; require signed assertions; set strict assertion lifetimes; enforce HTTP‑Only, SameSite=strict cookies.
- Session policies: Idle timeout (e.g., 30 min), absolute lifetime (e.g., 8–12 hrs), re‑auth for admin actions; device posture via IdP if available.
RBAC: Roles, Permissions, and Approval Flows
RBAC must be granular, auditable, and scalable. Start with well‑scoped roles and evolve toward attribute‑based controls as complexity grows.
Role Design Patterns
A practical baseline:
- Org Owner: Owns billing, global policies, and domain onboarding.
- Security Admin: Manages governance policies, DLP/CASB/DNS/TLS, audit exports.
- Domain Admin: Owns one or more vanity domains; manages link namespaces, approvals, and overrides for their domain(s).
- Project Admin: Manages a project/workspace (e.g., “Marketing‑EMEA”); assigns roles to contributors within scope.
- Link Manager: Creates/edits links, templates, UTMs, and campaign tags within project/domain scope.
- Viewer/Auditor: Read‑only analytics, exports, and audit trails.
- Service Account: Non‑interactive; scoped OAuth client with granular API permissions; rotated credentials.
Permission Matrix (Example)
| Capability | Org Owner | Security Admin | Domain Admin | Project Admin | Link Manager | Viewer/Auditor | Service Account |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manage Billing | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Global Policies | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Domain Onboarding | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ (owned) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Project/Workspace | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ (within domain) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Link Create/Edit | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ (scoped) |
| Approvals | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| View Analytics | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ (scoped) |
| Export/Audit | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ (scoped) |
Policy-Driven Access (Attribute‑ or Tag-Based)
Augment RBAC with ABAC/TBAC:
- Attributes: department=
Marketing, region=EMEA, classification=Public. - Tags: campaign=
BFCM-2025, product=Pro, sensitivity=Internal. - Policies (e.g., OPA/Rego) evaluate attributes + role to allow/deny create/edit/publish actions, or require approval if sensitive.
Change Management and Segregation of Duties
- Two‑person rule for edits on links over a threshold (e.g., >100k monthly clicks) or for managed domains.
- Draft → Review → Publish workflow with tracked comments.
- Frozen windows during critical launches; emergency override process with after‑action review.
Governance: Policies, Compliance, and Risk Controls
Governance codifies what’s allowed, what must be reviewed, what is retained, and who is accountable.
Link Governance Policies
- Naming & Slugs: Enforce patterns (
{team}-{campaign}-{keyword}) and length limits; disallow ambiguous or offensive strings. - Destination Rules: Allowlist corporate domains; optionally allow certain partner domains. Require HTTPS; block known URL shorteners to prevent daisy‑chaining.
- UTM Hygiene: Enforce lowercase keys, dedup, and canonical order; strip PII from UTMs; auto‑append campaign metadata using templates.
- Expiration & Rotation: Require expiry for temporary campaigns (e.g., 90 days). For evergreen links, mandate review dates.
- Password‑Protected Links and One‑Time Links for sensitive internal resources (with IP/device checks).
- QR Code Controls: Embed policy metadata in QR generation; watermark for internal; track versioning.
- Content Safety: Scan destinations at creation and periodically; quarantine suspicious links; require risk review.
Privacy, Legal, and Regulatory Alignment
- Data Minimization: Avoid collecting IPs or exact geolocation unless strictly needed. Use aggregation or hashing.
- Anonymization/Pseudonymization: Mask IP octets; truncate user agent strings; rotate salts.
- Retention: Default retention (e.g., 13 months) with shorter windows for sensitive regions; support legal hold.
- Regional Controls: Respect GDPR/CCPA/PDPA obligations: DSARs, consent records, data residency, and purpose limitation.
- Third‑Party Sharing: Document processors/sub‑processors; sign DPAs; classify outbound exports.
Auditability and Evidence
- Tamper‑Evident Logs: Append‑only, cryptographically verifiable streams for admin actions.
- Change History: Diffs for link edits (before/after), policy changes, domain settings, and role assignments.
- Evidence Packaging: Export audit bundles for regulators or customers: policy snapshots, control tests, and ticket references.
DLP, CASB, and Threat Intelligence
- DLP/CASB: Inspect destinations and query strings for PII; block patterns (
ssn=,card=); integrate with inline CASB for real‑time protection. - TI Feeds: Check destinations against malware/phishing feeds; auto‑quarantine with ticket creation.
- User Education: Inline warnings at creation time; proactive tips in the UI; monthly policy summaries.
Networking & Edge: Domains, TLS, and WAF
Vanity Domains and DNS Strategy
- Use brand‑aligned second‑level or subdomains (e.g.,
go.example.com,e.example). - DNS: CNAME to your edge; publish CAA records to limit issuers; use DNSSEC if supported.
- Multi‑domain support for subsidiaries and campaigns; delegate domain ownership to Domain Admins.
TLS Certificates and HSTS
- ACME automation for issuance/renewal; prefer ECDSA with RSA fallback.
- HSTS with preload (after verifying subdomain impacts);
includeSubDomainscautiously. - Enforce TLS 1.2+ (prefer 1.3); disable weak ciphers; use OCSP stapling.
CDN, WAF, and Bot Mitigation
- WAF: SQLi/XSS rulesets, custom allowlists/denylists, rate limiters per IP/ASN.
- Bot Management: Challenge automation that scrapes or inflates clicks; suppress noisy sources from analytics.
- Edge Caching: Cache durable artifacts (QR images, static redirects with long TTLs) while preserving real‑time analytics for click events.
Deployment Options: SaaS vs Self-Hosted
SaaS Pros and Cons
- Pros: Faster time‑to‑value, managed SSO/SCIM, battle‑tested SLAs, scaling and DDoS handled.
- Cons: Data residency constraints, limited extensibility, vendor lock‑in, API quotas.
- Mitigations: Contractual SLOs, export guarantees, on‑prem collectors for analytics, private vanity domains.
Self‑Hosted on Kubernetes (Reference Blueprint)
- Control Plane: Admin UI, API gateway, identity adapters (SAML/OIDC), SCIM server, policy engine (OPA), audit service.
- Data Plane: Redirect service (read‑optimized), analytics ingestion pipeline, stream processor (dedupe, enrichment), storage.
- Ingress: mTLS between edge and services; JWT validation; DDoS/rate‑limit.
- Resilience: Multi‑AZ, regional failover with anycast or DNS‑based steering; active‑active for redirect read path.
- Backups: PITR for DB; object storage for exports; tested restore runbooks.
Data Model and Policy Hierarchies
Core Entities
- Organization → Domain(s) → Project/Workspace → Link/QR.
- Policy objects at each level (global, domain, project) with override semantics.
- Tagging for campaigns, products, regions; classification for sensitivity.
Link Fields (suggested):slug, domainId, destinationUrl, status, createdBy, version, expiresAt, passwordHash, utmTemplateId, tags[], classification, createdAt, updatedAt.
Analytics Event (click):timestamp, linkId, ipHash, country, deviceType, uaHash, referrerDomain, campaign, botScore, firewallAction.
Inheritance and Overrides
- Global policy:
https only,utm-normalize=true. - Domain policy: allow partner domains
partners.example. - Project override: require approval for classification=
InternalorRestricted. - Link override: emergency kill‑switch with reason + ticket reference.
Operational Workflows
Link Creation Lifecycle
- Draft: User or API proposes destination + metadata.
- Policy Evaluation: Validate domain, UTMs, sensitivity; run DLP/TI checks.
- Approval (conditional): If sensitive/high‑reach, route to approvers (Domain/Project Admin).
- Publish: Assign slug; generate QR; push to edge.
- Monitor: Analytics stream; anomaly detection (CTR drops, bot surges).
- Update: Versioned edits; rollback available.
- Retire: Expire or 301 to evergreen destination; archive analytics per retention policy.
Bulk Operations and CSV/API Pipelines
- CSV Ingestion: Validate offline; dry‑run to list violations; provide row‑level errors and fix suggestions.
- API Pipelines: Idempotent
POST /linkswith client tokens; enforce rate limits and quotas; batch endpoints with partial success handling. - Backfills: High‑throughput writes via queue/stream with policy enforcement and throttling to protect production.
APIs, OAuth Scopes, and Webhooks
- Scopes:
links:read,links:write,domains:admin,analytics:export,policies:admin. - Granular Tokens: Per project/domain; short‑lived; bound to IPs or mTLS when feasible.
- Webhooks:
link.created,link.updated,link.quarantined,policy.changed,export.ready, signed with HMAC and replay protection.
Analytics, Observability, and SLOs
Analytics with Privacy Protections
- Aggregation first; only expand when justified.
- IP Anonymization: Truncate or hash with rotating salt.
- Bot Suppression: Exclude known datacenter ASNs and automated patterns from user‑facing metrics; keep raw data for security analytics.
- Attribution: Canonical UTM parsing; channel mapping; tooltip explanations in UI to reduce analyst error.
Logging, Metrics, and Tracing
- Structured Logs with correlation IDs; redact secrets/PII at source.
- Metrics: p50/p90/p99 redirect latency, error budgets, queue depth, policy violation rates.
- Tracing: Edge → gateway → service; sampling tuned to high‑traffic endpoints.
Service Level Objectives
- Availability: 99.95%+ for redirect path; maintenance windows for admin UI.
- Latency: p99 < 80 ms for redirect at edge; < 200 ms for API read endpoints in‑region.
- Error Budget Policy: Pace of change tied to budget burn; rollback triggers and freeze criteria documented.
Security Hardening Guide
Secrets Management and Key Rotation
- Use KMS/HSM for master keys; envelope encryption for stored secrets.
- Rotate API keys and signing secrets (webhooks/JWT) at least quarterly; dual‑key overlap to avoid downtime.
- Customer‑managed keys (CMK) option for highly regulated tenants.
Abuse Prevention and Link Hygiene
- Malware/Phishing Checks on create and scheduled re‑scans.
- Kill‑Switch to disable at domain, tag, or org level quickly.
- Rate Limits per token/IP; sliding window with bursts; 429s with standard backoff guidance.
- Shadow Bans for abusive actors to reduce adversary feedback.
IP, Geo, and Device Controls
- Allow/Deny Lists: Accept internal corporate ranges; deny risky geos if policy demands.
- Device Posture: Restrict admin UI to compliant devices (via IdP conditional access).
- Geo‑Pinned Links: Optional geo‑targeting with strict governance and consent records.
Cost, Performance, and Scale
- Edge Offload: Serve static QR, docs, and evergreen redirects from CDN cache.
- Hot Path Optimization: Keep redirect read path lock‑free; use memory caches and stable hashing for sharding.
- Storage Strategy: Separate OLTP (links) and OLAP (analytics). Compress and partition click events; tier to cold storage.
- Exports: Async; chunked; resumable; signed URLs; strict TTLs.
- Capacity Planning: Model peak QPS per domain; simulate BFCM/holiday surges; pre‑warm caches and autoscale targets.
Rollout Plan and Checklists
Phase 0 – Readiness
- Define roles, policies, and data classifications.
- Inventory vanity domains; validate DNS/TLS ownership.
- IdP sign‑off for SAML/OIDC/SCIM scopes and groups.
Phase 1 – Pilot
- Onboard Security + Marketing teams; use non‑production domains.
- Enable SSO, basic RBAC, analytics, and audit exports.
- Validate CSV/API pipelines and webhook flows.
Phase 2 – Org‑Wide
- Add domain admins for each brand/region.
- Enforce policy gates, approvals, and DLP/TI integrations.
- Publish runbooks, SOPs, and owner registry.
Phase 3 – Hardening & Scale
- Introduce two‑person approvals for high‑impact links.
- Tune WAF/bot rules; implement mTLS for privileged APIs.
- Setup SIEM/UEBA detections; quarterly tabletop exercises.
Operational Checklists (abridged)
- Identity: SSO tested (success/failure), SCIM dry‑run, group → role mappings approved.
- Security: WAF rules deployed, DLP/TI feeds active, secrets rotated, webhook signing verified.
- Compliance: Retention policies applied, DSAR playbook, audit bundle export works.
- Resilience: Backups restorable, failover tested, error budget policy documented.
- Analytics: Bot suppression verified, attribution logic signed off, export SLAs met.
Reference Templates
Sample RBAC Policy (YAML)
version: 1
roles:
- id: org_owner
inherits: [security_admin, domain_admin, project_admin]
privileges: [billing.manage, policies.manage_global]
- id: security_admin
privileges:
- policies.manage_security
- audit.export
- domains.tls_manage
- id: domain_admin
scope: { domains: ["brand.example.com", "go.example.com"] }
privileges:
- domains.manage
- projects.manage
- links.approve
- id: project_admin
scope: { projects: ["marketing-emea", "product-docs"] }
privileges:
- members.assign
- links.approve
- links.edit
- id: link_manager
privileges: [links.create, links.edit, links.publish]
- id: viewer
privileges: [analytics.view, audit.view]
- id: service_account
privileges: [links.create, analytics.export]
constraints:
- ip_allowlist: ["203.0.113.0/24"]
- mTLS_required: true
policies:
approvals:
required_if:
- condition: link.reach_estimate > 100000
- condition: link.classification in ["Internal", "Restricted"]
utm:
normalize_keys: true
allowed_keys: ["utm_source","utm_medium","utm_campaign","utm_term","utm_content"]
forbid_values_regex:
- "(?i)(email|phone|address|ssn|dob)"
destination:
require_https: true
allowlist_domains:
- "example.com"
- "*.example.com"
- "partners.example"
Example SAML/OIDC Config Snippets
SAML (SP metadata excerpts):
<EntityDescriptor entityID="https://shortener.example.com/saml/metadata">
<SPSSODescriptor AuthnRequestsSigned="true" WantAssertionsSigned="true" protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
<AssertionConsumerService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
Location="https://shortener.example.com/saml/acs" index="1" isDefault="true"/>
<AttributeConsumingService index="1">
<ServiceName xml:lang="en">Shortener</ServiceName>
<RequestedAttribute Name="email" FriendlyName="Email" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic" isRequired="true"/>
<RequestedAttribute Name="groups" FriendlyName="Groups" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"/>
</AttributeConsumingService>
</SPSSODescriptor>
</EntityDescriptor>
OIDC (well‑known style excerpt):
{
"issuer": "https://idp.example.com",
"authorization_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
"token_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/oauth/token",
"jwks_uri": "https://idp.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
"scopes_supported": ["openid","profile","email","groups","offline_access"],
"grant_types_supported": ["authorization_code","client_credentials","refresh_token"]
}
SCIM (group to role mapping, pseudo‑config):
scim:
group_role_map:
"shortener-admins": ["org_owner"]
"shortener-security": ["security_admin"]
"shortener-domain-go": ["domain_admin"]
"shortener-marketing": ["project_admin","link_manager"]
defaults:
new_user_role: "viewer"
Kubernetes Ingress Example
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: shortener-admin
annotations:
kubernetes.io/ingress.class: "nginx"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-url: "https://auth.example.com/oauth2/auth"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-signin: "https://auth.example.com/oauth2/start?rd=$request_uri"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: 10m
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/ssl-redirect: "true"
spec:
tls:
- hosts: ["admin.go.example.com"]
secretName: admin-tls
rules:
- host: admin.go.example.com
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: admin-ui
port:
number: 80
OPA/Rego Policy: Allowed Destination Domains
package shortener.policy.destination
default allow = false
allowed_domains = {
"example.com",
"partners.example",
}
# Permit subdomains of example.com
is_subdomain(host) {
endswith(host, ".example.com")
}
allow {
input.request.destination.scheme == "https"
host := input.request.destination.host
allowed_domains[host]
}
allow {
input.request.destination.scheme == "https"
host := input.request.destination.host
is_subdomain(host)
}
Webhook Event Payloads (Examples)
link.created
{
"id": "evt_01HZY3Z78G3",
"type": "link.created",
"created": 1730012345,
"data": {
"link": {
"id": "lnk_abc123",
"domain": "go.example.com",
"slug": "bfcm-2025",
"destination": "https://www.example.com/deals?utm_source=paid&utm_medium=meta&utm_campaign=bfcm-2025",
"tags": ["BFCM-2025","Paid","Meta"],
"classification": "Public"
}
},
"request": { "ip": "198.51.100.23" },
"signature": "t=1730012345,v1=6f7a..."
}
link.quarantined
{
"id": "evt_01HZY44P9KD",
"type": "link.quarantined",
"created": 1730012441,
"data": {
"link": {
"id": "lnk_abc124",
"domain": "go.example.com",
"slug": "promo-vendor",
"destination": "http://suspicious.tld/malware",
"reason": "ti:malware-feed",
"status": "quarantined"
}
},
"signature": "t=1730012441,v1=28be..."
}
FAQ Schema (JSON‑LD)
<script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "FAQPage",
"mainEntity": [{
"@type": "Question",
"name": "What is an enterprise URL shortener?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "A policy-driven platform for creating and managing short links at scale with SSO, SCIM, RBAC, audit trails, and security controls."
}
}, {
"@type": "Question",
"name": "Should we use SAML or OpenID Connect?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "Support both. SAML is common for browser SSO while OIDC is ideal for API access and modern apps. Your IdP strategy and app portfolio guide the choice."
}
}, {
"@type": "Question",
"name": "How do we enforce governance?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "Codify policies for destinations, UTMs, expiration, and approvals. Use DLP/TI integrations and audit exports. Apply RBAC and ABAC for least privilege."
}
}]
}
</script>
Conclusion
Enterprises need more than a “make it shorter” button. They need identity‑aware, policy‑enforcing, and audit‑ready link infrastructure that integrates with their IdP, secures the edge, and scales globally. By combining SSO/SCIM, granular RBAC/ABAC, and robust governance—with strong network controls, privacy‑preserving analytics, and operational SLOs—you can deliver a trustworthy platform for every team: marketing, sales, product, and IT security.
Use the templates and checklists in this guide to accelerate rollout: wire up SSO and SCIM, define roles and scopes, turn on WAF/bot mitigations, codify destination and UTM policies, and ship a reliable redirect path with real‑time visibility. With the right foundation, short links become an enterprise asset—secure, compliant, fast, and measurable.